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Asset Prices, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy 
in the Search Theory of Money
Ricardo Lagos
The author presents a search-based model in which money coexists with equity shares on a risky
aggregate endowment. Agents can use equity as a means of payment, so shocks to equity prices
translate into aggregate liquidity shocks that disrupt the mechanism of exchange. The author char-
acterizes a family of optimal monetary policies and finds that the resulting equity prices are inde-
pendent of monetary considerations. The author also studies monetary policies that target a con-
stant, but nonzero, nominal interest rate and finds that to the extent that a financial asset is valued
as a means to facilitate transactions, the asset’s real rate of return will include a liquidity return
that depends on monetary considerations. Through this liquidity channel, persistent deviations
from an optimal monetary policy can cause the real prices of assets that can be used to relax trad-
ing constraints to exhibit persistent deviations from their fundamental values. (JEL E31, E52, G12)
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process and play a role akin to a medium of
exchange—that is, they provide liquidity—the
term that monetary theorists use to refer to the
usefulness of an asset in facilitating transactions.
Financial assets are subject to price fluctua-
tions resulting from aggregate shocks; therefore,
to the extent that these assets serve as a source of
liquidity, shocks to their prices translate into aggre-
gate liquidity shocks that disrupt the mechanism
of exchange and the ensuing allocations. Recent
developments in financial markets have renewed
economists’ interest in the idea that fluctuations
in asset prices can disrupt the exchange process
in some key markets and, through this channel,
propagate to the macroeconomy.
Much of the policy advice offered to central
banks is framed in terms of simple interest rate
feedback rules loosely motivated by a particular
class of models in which the preeminent friction
is a specific type of reduced-form nominal rigid-
ity. Such policy recommendations are based on
M
any financial assets are held not
only for the intrinsic value of the
stream of consumption that they
yield, but also for their usefulness
in facilitating exchange. Consider a buyer who
cannot commit to or be forced to honor debts and
who wishes to make a purchase from a seller.
This buyer would find any asset that is valuable
to the seller (e.g., an equity share, a bond, money)
helpful to carry out the transaction. For example,
the buyer could settle the transaction on the spot
by using the asset directly as a means of payment.
In some modern transactions, often the buyer
uses a financial asset to enter a repurchase agree-
ment with the seller or as collateral to borrow the
funds needed to pay the seller. Once stripped
from the subsidiary contractual complexities,
the essence of these transactions is that the asset
helps the untrustworthy buyer to obtain what he
wants from the seller. In this sense, many finan-
cial assets are routinely used in the exchange
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policy is to mitigate the effects of these rigidities.
With no room or role for a notion of liquidity (and
typically even no meaningful role for money),
this conventional view that dominates policy
circles has failed to offer relevant policy guidance
in the midst of the recent financial crisis. I inter-
pret this failure as an indication that the consensus
stance toward monetary policy, with its theoreti-
cal focus on sticky price frictions and its imple-
mentation emphasis on ad hoc feedback interest
rate rules, is too narrow in that it neglects the
fundamental frictions that give rise to a demand
for liquidity.
In this article, I present a dynamic equilibrium,
microfounded monetary asset–pricing framework
with multiple assets and aggregate uncertainty
regarding liquidity needs, and discuss the main
normative and positive policy implications of
the theory. The broad view that emerges from
explicitly modeling the role of money and other
liquid assets in the exchange process is that of a
monetary authority that seeks to provide the pri-
vate sector with the liquidity needed to conduct
market transactions. More precisely, I state and
explain three propositions that answer the follow-
ing questions: How should monetary policy be
conducted to mitigate the adverse effects of shocks
to the valuations of the financial assets that pro-
vide liquidity to the private sector? What are the
implications for asset prices of deviating from the
optimal monetary policy? Are such deviations
capable of inflating real asset prices above their
fundamental values for extended periods of time?
MODEL
In this section I outline a bare-bones model
that encompasses the key economic mechanisms.1
The model combines elements of the asset-pricing
model of Lucas (1978) with elements of the model
of monetary exchange of Lagos and Wright (2005).
Time is discrete and the horizon infinite. There
is a [0,1] continuum of infinitely lived agents.
Each time period is divided into two subperiods
during which different activities take place. There
are three nonstorable and perfectly divisible con-
sumption goods at each date: fruit, general goods,
and special goods. Fruit and general goods are
homogeneous goods, whereas special goods come
in many varieties. The only durable commodity
in the economy is a set of “Lucas trees.” The num-
ber of trees is fixed and equal to the number of
agents. Trees yield (the same amount of) a random
quantity xt of fruit in the second subperiod of every
period t. The realization of xt becomes known to
all at the beginning of period t (when agents enter
the first subperiod). Production of fruit is entirely
exogenous: No resources are used and it is not
possible to affect the output at any time. The
motion of xt is assumed to follow a Markov process,
defined by its transition function 
For each fixed x, F￿·,x￿ is a distribution function
with support ʞ ￿ ￿0,￿￿.
In each subperiod, every agent is endowed
with n – units of time that can be used as labor
services. In the second subperiod, each agent has
access to a linear production technology that trans-
forms labor services into general goods. In the first
subperiod, each agent has access to a linear pro-
duction technology that transforms his own labor
input into a particular variety of the special good
that the agent does not consume. This specializa-
tion is modeled as follows: Given two agents i and
j drawn at random, there are three possible events.
The probability that i consumes the variety of
special good that j produces but not vice versa (a
single coincidence) is denoted α. Symmetrically,
the probability that j consumes the special good
that i produces but not vice versa is also α. In a
single-coincidence meeting, the agent who wishes
to consume is the buyer, and the agent who pro-
duces is the seller. The probability that neither
wants what the other can produce is 1 – 2α, with
α ≤ 1/2. Fruit and general goods are homogeneous
and hence consumed (and in the case of general
goods, also produced) by all agents.
In the first subperiod, agents participate in a
decentralized market where trade is bilateral
(each meeting is a random draw from the set of
pairwise meetings), and the terms of trade are
F x x x x x x t t ′ ( )= ≤ ′ = ( ) + , Pr . 1
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1 The analysis that follows is based on Lagos (2006, 2009, 2010).determined by bargaining (a take-it-or-leave-it
offer by the buyer, for simplicity). The specializa-
tion of agents over consumption and production
of the special good, combined with bilateral trade,
creates a double-coincidence-of-wants problem
in the first subperiod. In the second subperiod,
agents trade in a centralized market. Agents
cannot make binding commitments, and trading
histories are private in a way that precludes any
borrowing and lending between people, so all
trade—both in the centralized and decentralized
markets—must be quid pro quo.
Each tree has outstanding one durable and
perfectly divisible equity share that represents
the bearer’s ownership and confers to the owner
the right to collect the fruit dividends. A second
financial asset, money, is intrinsically useless (it
is not an argument of any utility or production
function), and unlike equity, ownership of money
does not constitute a right to collect any resources.
Money is issued by a “government” that at t = 0
commits to a monetary policy represented by a
sequence of positive real-valued functions, {ﾵt}￿
t = 0.
Given an initial stock of money, M0 > 0, a monetary
policy induces a money supply process, {Mt}￿
t = 0,
by means of Mt+1 = ﾵt￿xt￿Mt, where xt denotes a
history of realizations of fruit dividends through
period t—that is, xt = ￿xt,xt–1,…,x0￿. The govern-
ment injects or withdraws money through lump-
sum transfers or taxes in the second subperiod of
every period; thus, along every sample path,
Mt+1 = Mt + Tt, where Tt is the lump-sum transfer
(or tax, if negative). All assets are perfectly recog-
nizable, cannot be forged, and can be traded among
agents in both the centralized and decentralized
markets. At t = 0, each agent is endowed with a0
s
equity shares and a0
m units of fiat money.
Let the utility function for special goods, 
u : ￿
+ ₒ ￿
+, and the utility function for fruit, 
U : ￿
+ ₒ ￿
+, be continuously differentiable,
bounded by B on Ξ, increasing, and strictly con-
cave, with u￿0￿ = U￿0￿. Let –n be the utility from
working n hours in the first subperiod. Also, sup-
pose there exists q* ￿ ￿0,￿￿ defined by u′￿q*￿ = 1,
with q* ≤ n –. Let both the utility for general goods
and the disutility from working in the second sub-
period be linear. The agent prefers a sequence
{qt,nt,ct,yt,ht}￿
t = 0 over another sequence
{˜ qt, ˜ nt,˜ ct,˜ yt,˜ ht}￿
t = 0 if
where ʲ ￿ ￿0,1￿, qt and nt are the quantities of
special goods consumed and produced in the
decentralized market, ct denotes consumption of
fruit, yt consumption of general goods, ht the hours
worked in the second subperiod, and Et is an
expectations operator conditional on the infor-
mation available to the agent at time t, defined
with respect to the matching probabilities and
the probability measure induced by F.
Next, consider the individual optimization
problems. Let at = ￿at
s, at
m￿ denote the portfolio
of an agent who holds at
s shares and at
m units of
money. Let Wt￿at￿ and Vt￿at￿ be the maximum
attainable expected discounted utility of an agent
who enters the centralized and decentralized
market, respectively, at time t with portfolio at.
Then,
(1)  
The agent chooses consumption of fruit (ct), con-
sumption of general goods (yt), labor supply (ht),
and an end-of-period portfolio (at+1). Fruit is used
as numéraire: wt is the relative price of the general
good, ˆt
s is the (ex-dividend) price of a share, and
1/ˆt
m is the dollar price of fruit.
Let [qt￿a, a ˜￿, pt￿a, a ˜￿] denote the terms at
which a buyer who owns portfolio a trades with a
seller who owns portfolio a ˜, where qt￿a, a ˜￿ ￿ ￿
+
is the quantity of a special good traded, and 
pt￿a, a ˜￿ = [pt
s￿a, a ˜￿, pt
m￿a, a ˜￿] ￿ ￿
+ ￗ ￿
+ is the
transfer of assets from the buyer to the seller (the
first argument is the transfer of equity). Consider
a meeting in the decentralized market of period t
between a buyer with portfolio at and a seller with
portfolio a ˜ t. The terms of trade, ￿qt, pt￿, are deter-
mined by Nash bargaining where the buyer has
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a bilateral meeting cannot spend more assets than







m/wt. The bargaining outcome is as
follows: If ʻtat ≥ q*, the buyer buys qt = q* in
exchange for a vector pt of assets with real value
ʻtpt = q* ≤ ʻtat. Otherwise, he pays the seller 
pt = at, in exchange for qt = ʻtat. Hence, the
quantity of the special good exchanged is
min￿ʻtat, q*￿￿q￿ʻtat￿, and the real value of the
portfolio used as payment is ʻtpt￿at, a ˜t￿ = q￿ʻtat￿.
Given the bargaining solution, the value of
search to an agent who enters the decentralized
market of period t with portfolio at can be writ-
ten as
where S￿x￿￿ʱ{u[q￿x￿] – q￿x￿} is the expected gain
from trade in the decentralized market. Substitute
the budget constraint (equation (1)) and Vt￿at￿
into the right-hand side of Wt￿at￿ to arrive at
where ˄t = ʻt
mTt and ʻt = ￿ʻt
s, ʻt
m￿.
Given a process {Mt}￿
t = 0, an equilibrium is a
plan {ct, at+1}￿
t = 0, pricing functions {wt, ˆt}￿
t = 0, and
bilateral terms of trade {qt, pt}￿
t = 0 such that (i) given
prices and the bargaining protocol, {ct, at+1}￿
t = 0
solves the agent’s optimization problem; (ii) the
terms of trade are determined by Nash bargaining—
that is, qt = min￿ʻtat,q*￿ and ʻtpt = qt; and (iii)
the centralized market clears—that is, ct = xt and
as
t+1 = 1. The equilibrium is monetary if ˆt
m > 0
for all t, and in this case the money-market clear-
ing condition is am
t+1 = Mt+1. The market-clearing
conditions imply {ct, as
t+1, am
t+1}￿
t= 0 = {xt, 1, Mt+1}￿
t= 0,
wt = 1/U′￿wt￿, and once {ˆt}￿
t = 0 has been found,
{qt}￿
t = 0 = {ʻtpt}￿
t = 0 = {min￿ʛt+1, q*￿}￿
t= 0, where 
ʛt+1 ￿ ʻs
t+1 + ʻm
t+1Mt+1. Therefore, given a money
supply process {Mt}￿
t= 0 and letting L￿ʛt+1￿￿
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summarized by a sequence {ˆt}￿
t= 0 that satisfies




The Pareto optimal allocation in this environ-
ment can be found by solving the problem of a
social planner who wishes to maximize average
(equally weighted across agents) expected utility.
The planner chooses a plan {ct, qt, nt, yt, ht}￿
t = 0
subject to the feasibility constraints—that is, 
0 ≤ ct ≤ dt, yt ≤ ht, and 0 ≤ qt ≤ nt for those agents
who are matched in the first subperiod of period
tand qt = nt = 0 for those agents who are not. Under
these constraints, the planner’s problem consists
of finding a feasible plan {ct, qt}￿
t = 0 such that
for all feasible plans {˜ ct, ˜ qt}￿
t = 0. Here, E0 denotes
the expectation with respect to the probability
measure over sequences of dividend realizations
induced by F. The solution is {ct, qt}￿
t= 0= {xt, q*}￿
t= 0.
In equilibrium, ct = xt—that is, the equilibrium
consumption of fruit is at the efficient level.
However, the equilibrium allocation has qt ≤ q*,
which may hold with strict inequality in some
states. That is, in a monetary equilibrium, con-
sumption and production in the decentralized
market may be below their efficient levels.
It is convenient to introduce the following
notion of a nominal interest rate before stating
the results. Consider an illiquid nominal bond—
a one-period, risk-free government bond that
pays a unit of money in the centralized market
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Let ˆt
n denote the price of this asset. In equilib-





m is the money price
of a nominal bond, the (net) nominal interest rate
in a monetary equilibrium is it = ˆt
m/ˆt
n – 1 or,
equivalently,
(2)  
Proposition 1 Equilibrium quantities in a mone-
tary equilibrium are Pareto optimal if and only
if it = 0 with probability 1, for all t.
Proposition 1 establishes the optimality of
the Friedman rule—Milton Friedman’s (1969)
prescription that monetary policy should induce
a zero nominal interest rate to lead to an optimal
allocation of resources. The proof is as follows:
The equilibrium allocation is efficient if and only
if qt￿ʛt￿ = q*, and this equality holds if and only
if ʛt ≥ q*—that is, if and only if the real value of
the equilibrium portfolio, ʛt, is at least as large as
the real liquidity needs, represented by q*. The
nominal interest rate, it, is zero if and only if
L￿ʛt+1￿ = 1, and this equality holds if and only if
ʛt ≥ q*. Hence, qt￿ʛt￿ = q* if and only if it = 0.
Intuitively, the cost of producing real balances is
zero to the government, so the optimum quantity
of real balances should be such that the marginal
benefit—which in equilibrium equals the marginal
cost, it—is zero to the economic agents.
I next turn to the question of implementation:
Which monetary policies are consistent with a
monetary equilibrium in which the nominal inter-
est rate is at its optimal target level of zero? The
following result addresses the issue of (weak)
implementation by characterizing a family of
monetary policies that are consistent with an




s* + xt￿, and T be the set of dates for
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′( ) ∑ 1 ,
Assume that inft ￿ T ˀt > 0. A monetary equilibrium
with it = 0 with probability 1 for all t exists under
a deterministic money supply process {Mt}￿
t = 0 if
and only if the following two conditions hold: 
(3)  
(4)  
Conditions (3) and (4) are rather unrestrictive
asymptotic conditions. Condition (3) requires
that the money supply converges to zero. Condi  -
tion (4) requires that asymptotically, on average
over the set of dates T when fiat money plays an
essential role, the growth rate of the money supply
must be at least as large as the rate of time prefer-
ence. Versions of this result have been proven by
Wilson (1979) and Cole and Kocherlakota (1998)
for deterministic competitive economies with
cash-in-advance constraints that are imposed on
agents every period with probability 1.
Proposition 2 has several implications. First,
even though liquidity needs are stochastic in this
environment (because equity, whose value is
stochastic, can be used alongside money as a
means of payment), a deterministic money-supply
sequence can suffice to implement a zero nomi-
nal rate in every state of the world. Second, even
within the class of deterministic monetary poli-
cies, there is a large family of policies that can
implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium. Finally,
it would be impossible for someone with access
to a finite time-series for the path of the money
supply to determine whether an optimal mone-
tary policy is being followed. On the other hand,
a single observation of a positive nominal rate
constitutes definitive evidence of a deviation
from an optimal monetary policy.
POSITIVE RESULTS: INTEREST
RATE TARGETS AND ASSET PRICES
In this section, I consider perturbations of the
optimal monetary policy that consist of targeting
a constant positive nominal interest rate, and then
discuss some positive implications of changes in
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it is convenient to focus on a recursive formula-
tion in which prices are invariant functions of
the aggregate state st = ￿xt, Mt￿—that is, ˆt
s = ˆs￿st￿,
ˆt
m = ˆm￿st￿, and ʻt = ￿ʻs￿st￿, ʻm￿st￿￿, where ʻs￿st￿ =
U′￿xt￿[ˆs￿st￿ + xt], ʻm￿st￿ = U′￿xt￿ˆm￿st￿, and ʛt =
ʻs￿st￿ + ʻm￿st￿Mt. Also, I restrict attention to station-
ary monetary policies—that is, ﾵ : ʞₒ￿
+, so that
Mt+1 = ﾵ￿xt￿Mt. To illustrate the main ideas as sim-
ply as possible, the following proposition focuses
the analysis on the case of i.i.d. dividends and
liquidity constraints that would bind with prob-
ability 1 at every date in the absence of money.
Proposition 3 Assume dF￿x′, x￿ = dF￿x￿. Let l￿ʴ￿ =
1 – α + αu′￿ʴq*￿ and ʴ be defined by l￿ʴ￿ = 1/β.
Let ʴ 0 ￿ ￿ʴ,1￿ be given, and suppose that B ≤ 
[1 – βl￿ʴ 0￿]ʴ 0q*. Then for any ʴ ￿ [ʴ 0,1], there
exists a recursive monetary equilibrium under
the monetary policy
(5)  
The equilibrium prices of equity and money are
(6)   and 
(7)  
Together with equation (2), the asset prices in
equations (6) and (7) imply that the monetary
policy (equation (5)) induces an equilibrium gross
nominal interest rate that is constant (independent
of s) and equal to l￿ʴ￿ ≥ 1 (with equality only if 
ʴ = 1). The function ﾵ￿·;ʴ￿ defines a class of mone-
tary policies indexed by the parameter ʴ, which
effectively determines the level of the constant
nominal interest rate implemented by the policy.
According to equation (7), real money balances
and the value of money are decreasing in the
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According to equation (6), under the proposed
policy, the real price of equity is increasing in
the nominal interest rate target (decreasing in ʴ).
As ʴ ₒ 1, l￿ʴ￿ ₒ 1, and therefore (according to
Proposition 1) the policy ﾵ￿x;ʴ￿ approaches an
optimal policy under which the recursive mone-
tary equilibrium decentralizes the Pareto optimal
allocation.
Notice that ˆs￿x;1￿ is the “fundamental” equi-
librium equity price that would result in a Lucas
(1978) economy with no liquidity needs. There  -
fore, the fact that ˆs￿x;1￿ < ˆs￿x;ʴ￿ for all x and
any ʴ ￿ [ʴ 0,1￿ implies that deviations from the
optimal policy “inflate” real asset prices above
the value that a financial analyst would calculate
based on the expected stream of dividends dis-
counted by the Lucas stochastic discount factor,
βU′￿xt+1￿/U￿xt￿.
On average, liquidity considerations generate
a negative relationship between the nominal inter-
est rate (and the inflation rate) and equity returns:
If the target nominal rate, l￿ʴ￿ –1, is higher, the
average inflation rate is higher, real money bal-
ances are lower, and the liquidity return on equity
rises, which causes its price to rise and its meas-
ured real rate of return to fall. Intuitively, a higher
nominal interest rate target implies that buyers are
on average short of liquidity, so equity becomes
more valuable as it is used by buyers to relax their
trading constraints. This additional liquidity value
causes the real financial return on equity to be
lower, on average, at a higher interest rate.
Proposition 3 also shows explicitly how
monetary policy must be conducted to support a
recursive monetary equilibrium with a constant
nominal interest rate (with the Pareto optimal
equilibrium in which the nominal rate is zero
as a special case): The growth rate of the money
supply must be relatively low following states
in which the real value of the equilibrium equity
holdings is below average. Equivalently, the
implied inflation rate will be relatively low
between state x and a next-period state x′, if the
realized real value of the equilibrium equity hold-
ings in state x is below the state-x conditional
expectation of its value next period.
Lagos
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I have presented a simple version of a proto-
typical search-based monetary model in which
money coexists with a financial asset that yields
a risky real return. In this formulation, money is
not assumed to be the only asset that must, nor
the only asset that can, play the role of a medium
of exchange: Nothing in the environment prevents
agents from using equity along with money, or
instead of money, as a means of payment. Since
the equity share is a claim to a risky aggregate
endowment, the fact that agents can use equity
to finance purchases implies that they face aggre-
gate liquidity risk, in the sense that in some states
of the world, the value of equity holdings may
ultimately be too low relative to what would be
needed to carry out the transactions that require
a medium of exchange. This seems like a natural
starting point to study the role of money and mone-
tary policy in providing liquidity to lubricate the
mechanism of exchange in modern economies.
In this context, I characterized a large family
of optimal monetary policies. Every policy in this
family implements Friedman’s prescription of
zero nominal interest rates. Under an optimal
policy, equity prices and returns are independent
of monetary considerations. I have also studied a
class of monetary policies that target a constant,
but nonzero, nominal interest rate. For this pertur-
bation of the family of optimal policies, I found
that the model articulates the idea that, to the
extent that a financial asset is valued as a means
to facilitate transactions, the asset’s real rate of
return will include a liquidity return that depends
on monetary considerations. As a result of this
liquidity channel, persistent deviations from the
optimal monetary policy will cause the real prices
of assets that can be used to relax borrowing or
other trading constraints to exhibit persistent
deviations from their fundamental values.
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